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ABSTRACT
Changes in six-month bill rates over semiannual periods in the 1960s and
1970s are successfully related to expected changes and tosurprises. The
latter include unanticipated changes in expected inflation, in thegrowth of
industrial production and base money, and in inflationuncertainty. Estima-
tion of the basic equation through the middle of 1983 does notsuggest any
change in structure. Moreover the equation "explains" 60 percent of the
extraordinarily high level of real rates since late 1980, largely owing to an
excess of unexpected net increases in anticipated inflation over actual
increases.
Our estimates provide some support for the expectations theory; there
appears to be information content in six-month forward rates. While this
content is swamped by the impact of surprises in equationsexplaining rate
changes in terms of forward rates alone, the content is clear whenproxies for
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The height and volatility of interest rates in the early l980s
spectacularly exceeded that of the past half century. Various researchers
have attributed this to: the sharp increase and decline in inflation, the
special characteristics of recent monetary (the monetarist experiment) and
fiscal (the structural deficit) policies, and mysterious or unidentified
forces.The present paper estimates the relationship between the six—month
Treasury bill rate and its determinants in the l960s and 1970s. The purpose
is to test various hypotheses regarding interest-rate determination and to
determine whether this relationship was altered markedly in the early l980s.
The short-term bill rate is chosen for investigation for two reasons.
First, the yield on a short—term instrument is independent of longer—term
expectations regarding inflation, output growth, and fiscal and monetary
policies. Longer-term yields should depend heavily on such variables. While
reasonably accurate measures of expectations over, say, a six-month horizon
can probably be deduced (are, in fact, available from survey data), longer—
term expectations are both more uncertain and vary more widely across market
participants. Second, analysis of a short-term bill rate allows an easy test
of the expectations theory of interest rates. Recent studies by Shiller,
Campbell and Schoenholtz (1983) and by Mankiw and Summers (1983) suggest that
observed interest rate movements are unrelated to expected changes in rates
1See Clarida and Friedman (1982) and Makinand Tanzi (1983) for discussions of
these attributions.—2—
extracted from the term structure of short-term rates, calling into question
the validity of the expectations theory.2 The sixth-month bill rate is
analyzed because it meshes best with the Livingston survey data.
Our framework draws together two views of interest rate determination:
the expectations theory whereby expected changes in the six-month rate can be
inferred from the six-month forward rate, and structural models of rates in
which unexpected changes can be attributed to unanticipated changes in
expected inflation, economic activity, and monetary growth. To anticipate the
results, there does not appear to be a marked change in the interest-rate
relation in recent years; the 1979—80 rise and 1981—82 decline in the six—
month rate are well explained by a reduced—form equation estimated over the
1960-79 period. Further, the expectations theory is supported by the data;
when variables explaining unexpected changes in interest rates are included in
the estimation equation, the expected rate change performs as anticipated.
The present paper is divided into five broad parts. The first is an
examination of real before- and after-tax six—month bill rates in the 1960-82
period; the second presents the framework for the empirical analysis; the
third reports the results; the fourth discusses the determinants of the bill
rate in the 1980—mid83 period; and the fifth summarizes.
I. Movements in Real Six Month Bill Rates, Before and After Tax
Figure 1 contains plots of the real six-month bill rate, before and
after tax. The bill rate is the average of daily figures, on a bond-
equivalent basis, for June and December of the years 1960-82, and the expected
inflation data are the corresponding numbers for six-month inflation from the
Livingston survey. The extraordinarily high level of real bill rates in the






























































































































































































































































































l980s is obvious. In the five observations from December 1980 to December
1982, the real bill rate averaged 6 percent. This is 4 percentage points
higher than the average of the 1960s and 1970s and 4 3/4 percentage points
greater than the 1971-79 span.
The appropriate tax rate to employ in a study of real after-tax bill
rates is uncertain, and it would probably not be difficult to find economists
who would advocate rates as low as zero and as high as the corporate tax rate.
For illustrative purposes, we utilize an intermediate rate, a weighted average
of marginal personal tax rates for each adjusted gross income class.During
the 1960—82 period, this series ranged between 0.24 and 0.38 and averaged
0.30. The June rate is that for the year in which it falls; the December rate
is an average of the year in which it falls and the following year.
The after-tax real bill rate, so calculated, tells a far different story
than the before-tax real rate. In only one observation in the l980s is the
real after—tax rate above the average in the l960s. The rate is high in the
1980s only relative to the extraordinarily low rates in the l970s.
One extreme outlier in both rate series in recent years is worthy of
note. The -3 percent real bill rate in June 1980 was 2½ percent below any
other observed bill rate in the entire period, and the -5.8 percentage points
after—tax real rate was 3½ percentage points below any other. Moreover, the
declines from December 1979 were 5½ and 4 percentage points, respectively, and
the increases between June and December 1980 were 8½ and 5 percentage points,
respectively. The record declines to unprecedented lows and the even sharper
immediate reversal cry out for an extraordinary explanation. Fortunately, one
is available.
3For details on the construction of this series, see Peek (1983) who kindly
made the series available to me.—5-.
In response to a sharp increase in the inflation rate in early 1980 from
an already high level, President Carter issued an executive order for the
Federal Reserve to curb the growth in credit.4 On March 14, the Federal
Reserve implemented a credit controls program which included a noninterest
bearing reserve requirement of 15 percent on increases in credit. Apparently
as a result, consumer installment credit outstanding contracted at an annual
rate of 10½ percent in the April-May period, the first decline since May 1975
and the largest reduction in the postwar era.5 The program was eased in late
May and terminated on July 24, 1980. It is difficult to imagine explaining
the sharp, temporary drop in bill rates in the middle of 1980 without
explicitly accounting for the credit restraint program.
II. The Conceptual Framework
Our starting point is the tax-adjusted Fisher equation whereby the
after-tax nominal rate { (l-T)RJ to investors equals the after-personal-taxes
real rate (r) plus the expected rate of inflation (it):
(l—T)R=r÷ it. (1)
Next is the specification of the determinants of r. A number of smallmacro
models have been utilized to derive real rate relations [Levi and Makin
(1979) ,Melvin(1982) ,Peek(1982), Wilcox (1983) and Makin and Tansi (1983) j.
4The consumer price indexaccelerated most rapidly and virtually the entire
acceleration was due to the inappropriate inclusion of mortgage interestrates
in the index. The expected six-month inflation rates givenby the Livingston
survey for December 1979 and June and December 1980 were 10.1, 10.7 and 10.5
percent, respectively.
5Federal ReserveBulletin, August 1980, p. 634.—6—
The resulting set of determinants depends on both the specified behavioral
equations and the substitutions made in deriving the reduced forms. For our
purposes, we specify a simple two-equation IS-LMModel:6
-+ -- ?+ M + + ++
I(r, TbI it CU, a, CC) + X =S(r,Q, ,CC)+ T(T, Tbf Q) (2)
- ++ +e M
L[ (r+n) ,Q,a, M—M I =, (3)
where I is a function representing both household and business investment, Tb
is the tax rate on business investment (reflecting the statutory rate, the
investment tax credit and depreciation tax schedules for a given inflation
rate) ,CUis the capacity utilization rate,measures uncertainty regarding
inflation, CC refers to the 1980 credit controls discussed above, X is real
exogenous (defense) demand for output, Q is the supply of real output
(production), M is base money, Me is its expected value, P is the price level,
and T is the tax-transfer function. The signs of the partial derivatives are
indicated above the arguments in the functions. While most of these are
obvious, three merit disciion. First, the hurdle rate for the business
component of investment is positively related to business, not personal, tax
parameters and to the expected inflation rate (owing to the use of historic-
cost depreciation and FIFO inventory accounting). Thus increases in these
lower investment and real interest rates {Feldstein and Summers, 1978, and
Hendershott, 1981, pp. 913—14]. Second, the impact of greater inflation
uncertainty on interest rates is ambiguous; risk-averse investors will require
6lntroduction of an aggregate supply equation would introduce supply-shock
variables into the specification of the real rate a la Wilcox (1983)
Preliminary experimentation with such variables was not promising.—7.-
higher nominal returns, but investors in real capital will not be willing to
pay such returns (Levi and Makin, 1979, p 42). Third, the difference between
the actual and expected level of base money captures the impact of deviations
from money targets on anticipated future monetary policy; above targetmoney
generates expectations of a more restrictive policy, lowering the demand for
bonds and thus raising the demand for money and interest rates.7 Solving for
r, assuming that the real interest rate effect in the investment function and
the output response in the money demand function dominate, yields
+ ++ —-+e? -- r=(Q,CU, X, ir, CC, M—M ,a, (3')
Substitution of (3') into (1), first-differencing, using the relation
tx[1-t)R] =(l-tR-
R11T,and solving for the change in the nominal rate
leads us to the following linear approximation:
2 l-J4 = +—%X + Mr + —CC + —U%M+ — l—l ll lT
R_1+
(4)
+AT + LT JJJT
where the 's have the same signs as the partials of thefunction (changes
in the Q and CU variables are combined in the %AQ term), U%tM is the
unexpected percentage change in M, and c is a stochastic error term.
7Makin (1982) notes thatpositive money surprises tend to lower interest rates
by raising output and saving and to raise rates by raising expected inflation.
Because current output and expected inflation are represented in the model,
these effects are already incorporated.-8-
Conceptually, the change in the interest rate and in all the other
variables can be partitioned into expected and unexpected components. The
total change in the interest rate then equals the expected change plus the
unexpected parts of the terms on the right-hand side of (4)
7aGiven the
six—month time frame considered here, it seems reasonable (and is certainly
convenient) to assume that tax rate and defense expenditures changes are
largely anticipated owing to the lags between the known intent of future
legislation and the actual implementation.8 On the other hand, changes in
inflation uncertainty and the credit controls are, almost by definition, fully
unexpected. Thus only the output and inflation terms are viewed as having
both expected and unexpected components. With these assumptions, we can write
2 l_
tR =ER+ U%Q+4tThlT + —CC+—tJ%M+—2—na+c, (5)
0 lT lT lTlT lT U
where an E denotes the expected change and U the unexpected change, and
should be unity.
There are two advantages to estimating equation (5) rather than (4).
First, the expectations theory of the term structure can be tested directly.
A strong test is that is both significantly greater than zero and not
7aLet E denote the expected change and U the unexpected change. Then






8The "causality" of this sentence is somewhat misleading. As noted earlier, a
short—term bill rate was selected for analysis in part so that this assumption
would be reasonable.—9—
significantly different from unity, i.e., forward rates have informational
content and the data are not inconsistent with the pure theory. The
individual parts of the hypothesis constitute weak tests. Second, the
measurement of T and Tb is less important for the estimation of (5) than of
(4) .Theprincipal effect of change in taxes on AR comes through the ATand
terms which do not appear in (5).
II. The Estimates
A. The Data
The dependent variable is the observed percentage change in themonthly
average (June and December) of daily six-month bill rates calculated on a
bond-equivalent annual basis. The change that was expected is the difference
between the value expected six months earlier[E1 (R)] and the value six
months ago (R1). This change is assumed to be the forward rate --computed







where R2 is the twelve—month bill rate.9
The unexpected change in the expected six-month inflation rate isthe
difference between the observed change and that expected, EMr =E1(ir)
—
whereE1(T) can be computed analogously to E1(R) from inflation rates over
9Following Mishkin (1982), the differencebetween the expected and forward
rates was hypothesized to depend on interest-rateuncertainty. When this was
approximated by our measure of inflation uncertainty (see below)
,themeasure
had a coefficient very near zero.-10--
the next six and twelve months that were expected six months ago. These data
are based on Livingston's survey.10
For the output variable, we use industrial production because it is
available monthly and forecasts of six-month changes in it can be derived from




where IP is the level of the industrial production index during the last month
(June or December) of the period.
Following Levi and Makin (1979) and Makin and Tanzi (1983), the change
in the standard deviation of expected six—month inflation is assumed to be
linearly related to the change in the standard deviation of the expectations
of Livingston survey respondents.
To my knowledge, there are no available appropriate survey measures of
anticipated monetary growth. Two variables were tested: the actual growth
rates during the previous one and two years. For the monetary variable, the
adjusted monetary base computed by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis was
employed. Because the results were very similar, we only report equations in
which unanticipated monetary growth defined as the difference between the
growth rate during the current semiannual period and the average growth rate
in the previous two years.
The consumer—credit-control variable is defined as plus one in June
1980, minus one in December 1980, and zero elsewhere.
10These data and all others based on the Livingston survey were kindly
supplied by Donald Mullineaux of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.—11—
B. Estimates for 1960—79
Daily—average bill—rate data first became available in 1960. Thus the
maximum estimation span is the end of 1960 to the end of 1982 or 45 semiannual
observations. Equations (l.l)—(l.4) in Table 1 are estimated on dataprior to
the gyration of rates in 1980 and the high levels of late 1980through the
middle of 1982.11 In (1.1), only the expected change in the bill rate is
employed as a regressor. Equations (l.2)-(l.4) are estimates of equation (5)
utilizing different specifications of t,themarginal-tax rate on personal
interest income. In (1.2), the tax rate is assumed to be constant, and the
constant value is embedded in the coefficients on all variables except the
expected change in rate. In (1.3), Peek's estimate of ,discussedearlier is
employed. In (1.4), an estimate of tisextracted from Salomon and Hutzler
yields on six-month Treasury bills and prime tax-exempt securities, the
estimate being 1 less the ratio of the exempt to taxable yields for the first
day of the relevant month.
The near zero coefficient on the expected change in rate in (1.1) is
consistent with the recent results of Shiller et al (1983) and Mankiw and
Summers (1983). Note, however, that the coefficient is not measured with
precision; the estimate is not significantly different from 0.8, although it
does differ from unity. When unexpected changes in expected inflation,
industrial production, and base growth (as well as the change in the standard
deviation of expected inflation) are added to the equation tocapturesome of
unexpected changes in interest rates [see equation (1.2)), the coefficient on
the expected percentage change in rate becomes significantlygreater than zero
at the 0.05 level and within a standard error of unity. The coefficientson
these equations all variables, including the constant term, have been















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the inflation and economic-activity variables are also significantly greater
than zero; the coefficients on the change in inflation uncertainty and the
money surprise are about a standard error greater than zero.
Comparison of equations (1.3) and (1.4) with (1.2) reveals only minor
differences. Because l-r is embedded in the coefficients in (1.2) -—except
the constant and that on EtR --theother coefficients in (1.3) and (1.4) must
be divided by the respective mean values of l—r to make them comparable to
(1.2) and to each other. These means are 0.70 and 0.57. When this division
is made, no coefficient in (1.3) or (1.4) differs from its counterpart in
(1.2) by as much as 7½ percent. Moreover, the explanatory powers of the three
equations are virtually identical.(This contrasts with Peek's finding that
division by 1-tsignificantlyimproves the fit.) Given the uncertainty
regarding the correct measurement of r, this does not seem surprising.
Equation (1.5) in Table 1 extends the estimation period through the
middle of 1983. The coefficients exhibit remarkable stability in face of the
unprecedented changes in interest rates in the 1980-mid83 period; as does the
equation standard error. The measured increase in explanatory power is
attributable entirely to the ability of the consumer-credit dummy to capture
the sharp seesaw in the bill rate in 1980. To test for a change in structure,
a zero-one dummy variable assuming the one value after 1979 was interacted
with the three significant variables: EAR, UMr and U%AQ. The t ratios on
these three variables ranged from 0.1 to 0.6 and the equation standard error
increased.
C. The Impact of the Explanatory Variables, 1960-82
Expected increases in the six—month bill rate never exceeded a full—14—
percentage point in the 1960-82 Span, but they were in the 65-100 basis point
range in 13 semiannual periods. While declines were larger than 65 basis
points in only four periods, these include nearly one and a half and over two
percentage point expected declines in the first halves of 1980 and 1981. The
0.72 estimated coefficient in equation (1.2) of Table 1 suggests that 72
percent of these expectations were translated into actual movements.
The estimates and underlying data imply some major impacts of
unanticipated changes in expected inflation. Substantial unanticipated
increases occurred following the oil price shocks, raising the bill rate by 3
percentage points in 1973-74 and by nearly 5 points in 1979-80. In contrast,
the bill rate fell by a full percentage point in the first half of 1975 and by
nearly 4½ points in 198l-mid83 because of unanticipated declines in expected
inflation.
unanticipated industrial-production growth (or decline) also had
substantial effects on the bill rate over parts of the 1960-82 period. The
unexpectedly strong recovery following the Kennedy-Johnson tax cuts in the
early l960s raised the bill rate by 1 and 3/4 percentage points in the 1963-66
span. Similarly, the surprisingly strong rebound from the middle of 1980 to
the middle of 1981 increased the bill rate by nearly a percentage point. On
the other hand, the unexpectedly sharp declines in output from the middle of
1973 to the middle of 1975 and from the middle of 1981 to the end of 1982
lowered the bill rate by 1 1/4 and 1 3/4 percentage points, respectively.
Monetary surprises and changes in inflation uncertainty have not had as
large impacts on the bill rate as have the other variables. Most importantly,
the increased uncertainty accompanying the rise in inflation in the 1973-mid74
and l978—mid8l periods each raised the bill rate by about 3/4 of a percentage
point. The subsequent declines in uncertainty lowered the rate by somewhat—15—
less. Positive money surprises increased the bill rate by about 40 basis
points in the early 1960s, in 1967—68 and in l977—mid78; negative surprises
lowered the rate by a like amount in l969-mid70 and 1981.
III. The Recent Experience
The actual and forecasted changes in the bill rate for semi-annual
segments of the 1980-mid83 period are reported in Table 2. The forecasts are
based upon equation (1.2). As can be seen in column 3, there are large,
nearly offsetting, forecast errors in the first and second halves of 1980
(owing to the imposition and removal of credit controls); the equation
underforecasts by a percentage point in 1981 (the forecasted decline is 4 1/2
percentage points, not the 3 1/2 observed); large, somewhat offsetting errors
occur in 1982 (the equation forecasts a roughly continuous decline, rather
than the observed increase and then sharp decline); and about half of the rise
in early 1983 is forecast. Given the offsetting nature of the errors, the
cumulative error on the level of the bill rate (indicated in column 4 of Table
1) is small. By late 1982 and early 1983, the forecasted bill rate was less
than a percentage point below the actual.
Table 3 indicates the sources of the rise and fall in the bill rate
between June 1978 and June 1983. Eighty percent (6.70 percentage points) of
the 8.42 increase to December 1980 is explained by the equation. Over 5
points is due to unexpected increases in anticipated inflation, two-thirds of
a point to unexpected increases in output, a half point to the increase in
inflation uncertainty and a third point to other factors. Because the
expected inflation rate rose by only 4.1 percentage points, the real interest
rate increased by 4.3 percentage points. Of this rise the estimated equation—16—
Table 2: Actual and Forecasted Bill Rate Changes, l980-mid83
(percentage points)
Actual Forecast Actual Cumulative
[Equ. (2)] -Forecast Difference
19801 —5.08 0.22 —5.30
2 8.34 2.28 6.06 0.76
_1_ U.tDD .L. Z.UU
2 —2.98 —2.68 —0.30 1.70
1982 1 1.36 —1.25 2.61 4.31
2 —5.13 —1.36 —3.77 0.54
1983 1 0.81 0.36 0.45 0.99—17—
Table 3:
The 1978—82 Interest Rate Cycle
June 78 -Dec.80 Dec. 80 -June83
Change in Rate 8.42 -6.59
Due to: Unexpected Change in
Expected Inflation 5.16 -4.38
Unexpected Change in




change in the rate) 0.35 —0.81
Total 6.70 —6.81
Unexplained Change 1.72 -0.22—18—
explains 2.6 (6.7 -4.1)points or sixty percent. The estimated relationship
also explains 60 percent of the extraordinarily high average real bill rates
in the early 1980s)2
One and a half percentage points of the 2.6 percentage-point explained
increase in the real bill rate can be attributed to the unanticipated
increases in industrial production, inflation uncertainty and other factors
noted above. However, the primary single factor contributing to the rise was
unexpected increases in inflation far in excess of the actual 4.1 percentage
point increase. From mid1978 to midl979, no increase was expected, but a two
point rise occurred. From late 1979 to late 1980 half point increases were
anticipated, while the actual expected rate rose by another two points. In
total, the cumulated unexpected increase in anticipated inflation over this
span was a full 7 percentage points.13 Even though the estimated coefficient
on expected inflation increases is only 0.74, implying that the nominal bill
rate rises by only three-quarters of a point for every point of unanticipated
increase in inflation, the forecasted nominal bill rate rises by 5.2 points
because of this 7 point increase and thus the real bill rate rises by over a
full point.
Between the end of 1980 and the middle of 1983, the bill rate declined
l2 was noted in Section I that the real six-month bill ratewas 4 3/4
percentage points too high, relative to the l970s, for the 5 observations from
802 to 822. The average cumulative forecast error for our equation for those
periods is a little under 2 percentage points, indicating that only 40 percent
of the high average value need be attributed to unidentified factors.
13These large errors are not surprising given the second oilprice shock and
the nearly 4 percentage point increase in home mortgage rates, both of which
heavily influenced the CPI, during this period. A crude measure of inflation
surprises is the difference between the all-items CPI and the all-items less
food, energy and home purchase and finance, the excluded items being difficult
to predict (especially when an oil shock occurs). For 1978, 1979 and 1980,
this difference was 2.1, 5.8 and 2.5 percentage points, respectively.—19--
over 6 1/2 percentage points. This decline, which was almostentirely a fall
in nominal rates (expected inflation decreased by 6.2percentage points), is
fully explained by our estimation equation. All the factors that contributed
to the early increase in rates reversed themselves, inducing thedecline.
Unexpected declines in industrial production, inflation uncertainty, and the
catch-all other tended to lower the real rate by almost 2 1/2percentage
points, but rough equality between unexpected and actual declines in
inflation, along with the only partial (0.74) response of nominal ratesto
unexpected changes in inflation, tended to raise the estimated real rate,
resulting in virtually no change.
At this point, one might ask about the impact of theunprecedented
federal deficits. A simple response is that deficitswere not unprecedented
through the period analyzed. From midl98l to mid1982, the high-employment
deficit was only $12 billion or 0.3 percent of high-employmentGNP. In the
year midl982 to mid1983, this deficit jumped to $48 billion, but the ratio to
high employment GNP, 1.1 percent, was still no greater than in 1975.High-
employment deficits have been large only since the thirdyear of the personal
tax cut went into effect in July 1983.14 Thus there isno reason to believe
that short-term Treasury rates were high in the l98l-mid83period because of
the deficits. On the other hand, short-term rates couldnow (1984) be higher
than they would be in the absence of the structural deficit)5
14VonFurstenburg (1981) has documented a systematic tendency for lawmakers to
cut taxes during rec.essions and generally run largehigh-employment deficits
in early stages of economic recoveries.
15Hendershott andShilling (1982) calculated that the ERTA of 1981 could raise
real interest rates by nearly two percentage points in thenew equilibrium
owing to higher steady-state business investment. For an analysissuggesting
that the cuxnraulation of deficits raised three-yearTreasury rates in 1983, se.
deLeeuw and Holloway, 1983.-20—
IV.Summary
Changes in six-month bill rates over semiannual periods since 1960 have
been successfully related to expected changes and to surprises. The latter
include unanticipated changes in expected inflation, in the growth of
industrial production and base money, and in inflation uncertainty, as well as
the imposition and removal of consumer credit controls in 1980. Surprise
revisions in inflation expectations had large effects (3 to 5 percentage
points) and errors in forecasts of industrial-production growth had moderate
impacts (1 to 2 percentage points) on the six-month bill rate in a number of
periods. Monetary-growth surprises and changes in inflation uncertainty had
smaller positive impacts.
Our estimates provide support for the expectations theory; there is
information content in forward rates. While this content is swamped by the
impact of surprises in equations explaining rate changes in terms of forward
rates alone, the content is clear when proxies for the surprises are included
in the equations.
Real six—month bill rates rose by over 4 percentage points between June
1978 and December 1980 and averaged 4 3/4 percentage points more in 1981 and
1982 than they did in the l970s. Forecasts from a reduced-form equation
estimated over the 1960-79 period "explain" sixty percent of both the increase
and the high 1981-82 average. The primary cause of the high real rates is the
asymmetry between increases and decreases in unexpected changes in anticipated
inflation relative to observed changes. Between June 1978 and December 1980,
unexpected increases exceeded observed by 3 percentage points (7 versus 4).
Between December 1980 and June 1983, unexpected and observed declines were
roughly equal (6 1/4 percentage points). The estimation equation also—21--
explains the full 7 1/2 percentage point decline in the nominal six—month rate
during 1981 and 1982, although rates did not come down as rapidly as the
equation predicts.
The current paper tells only part of the recent interest rate story.
The full story requires the modeling of expected changes in all the variables
utilized in this study: the bill rate itself, anticipated inflation,
industrial production growth, monetary growth, tax rates and expenditures
policies. This is an agenda for future research.—22--
References
R.H. Clarida and B.M. Friedman, "Why Were Short—Term Real Interest Rates So
High?," mimeo, September 1982.
F. deLeeuw and T.M. Holloway, "The Measurement and Significance of the
Cyclically Adjusted Federal Budget," mimeo, December 1983.
E. Fama, "The Information in the lerm btrucrure," enter for Researcu in
Security Prices, Working Paper. No. 111, University of Chicago, October
1983.
M. Feldstein and L.H. Summers, "Inflation, Tax Rules, and the Long-Term
Interest Rate," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1978, 61-99.
P.H. Hendershott and J.D. Shilling, "Capital Allocation and the Economic
Recovery Tax Act of 1981," Public Finance Quarterly, 2, April 1982,
242—273.
P.H. Hendershott, "The Decline in Aggregate Share Values: Taxation Valuation
Errors, Risk and Profitability," American Economic Review, December
1981, 909—922.
M.D. Levi and J.H. Makin, "Fisher, Phillips, Friedman and the Measured Impact
of Inflation on Interest," Journal of Finance, 34, March 1979, 35—52.—23—
N.G. Mankiw and L.H. Summers, "Do Long-Term Interest Rates Overreact To
Short-Term Interest Rates?," mimeo, May 1983.
J.H. Makin, "Money Surprises and Short-Term Interest Rates: Reconciling
Contradictory Findings," NBER Working Paper No. 993, September 1982.
J.H. Makin and V. Tanzi, "The Level and Volatility of Interest Rates in the
United States: The Role of Expected Inflation, Real Rates, and Taxes,"
NBER Working Paper No. 1167, July 1983.
M. Melvin, "Expected Inflation, Taxation, and Interest Rates: The Delusion of
Fiscal Illusion," American Economic Review, 72, September 1982, 841—845.
F.S. Mishkin, "Monetary Policy and Short-Term Interest Rates:An Efficient
Markets-Rational Expectations Approach," The Journal of Finance, Vol.
XXXVII, No. 1, March 1982, 163—72.
J. Peek, "Interest Rates, Income Taxes, and Anticipated Inflation." American
Economic Review, 72, December 1982, 980—91.
R.J. Shiller, J.Y. Campbell, and K.L. Schoenholtz, "Forward Rates and Future
Policy: Interpreting the Term Structure of Interest Rates," Brookings
Papers on Economic Activity, 1: 1983, 173—217.
G.M. von Furstenberg, "Saving," in Aaron and Peckman (eds.), How Taxes Affect
Economic Activity, The Brookings Institution, 1981, pp. 340-45.
J.A. Wilcox, "Why Real Interest Rates Were So Low in the 1970's," American
Economic Review, 73, March 1983,44-53.